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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 John Dixon Clark appeals from his convictions for burglary and grand 
theft. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Buddy Crabbe and his wife, Katrina Crabbe, were caretakers for real 
property formerly owned by Mrs. Crabbe’s deceased grandfather, Gordon 
James.  (Tr., p. 126, L. 13 - p. 128, L. 9.)  The property was located on Riverview 
drive in Kootenai County, and it contained a house, locked shed, and locked 
barn where the Crabbe family would store their property.  (Tr., p. 127, Ls. 18-20; 
p. 129, Ls. 8-16.)  This property included a headlamp Mr. Crabbe kept in the 
house.  (Tr., p. 139, L. 20 – p. 140, L. 19.) The shed contained financial 
transaction cards belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Crabbe, as well as property 
belonging to Mr. Crabbe: old license plates, a padlock, a small toolbox with tools, 
including a screwdriver, and Mr. Crabbe’s driver’s license.  (Tr., p. 140, L. 20 – p. 
141, L. 13; p. 142, Ls. 11-15; p. 142, L. 25 – p. 143, L. 7; p. 143, L. 17 – p. 144, 
L. 18.)  Finally, Mr. James’s personal property was also stored at the Riverview 
property barn, including his financial transaction cards, war medals and ribbons, 
and a red ledger.  (Tr., p. 142, Ls. 16-24; p. 143, Ls. 8-16; p. 144, L. 19 – p. 145, 
L. 15.) 
 On November 3, 2015, Mr. Crabbe was checking the Riverview property 
when he realized all three structures had been burglarized.  (Tr., p. 132, L. 19 – 
p. 133, L. 25.)  He determined that the house had been broken into, the locks on 
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the shed and barn had been cut, and property was missing from all three 
buildings.  (Tr., p. 133, Ls. 11-25;  p. 145, p. 16 – p. 146, L. 25.) 
 The Crabbe family called the police, left the Riverview property, and 
returned later that night with their children to “turn some more lights on the 
property and just make a presence.”  (Tr., p. 134, Ls. 1-16.)  The family “sat in 
the driveway” and waited until around 12:30 a.m.  (Tr., p. 134, L. 12 – p. 135, L. 
20.)  At this point family spotted a vehicle slowly drive past the property.  (Tr., p. 
135, L. 20 – p. 136, L. 2.)  The vehicle kept driving, but then came back, and 
pulled into the driveway.  (Tr., p. 136, Ls. 1-4.)  Mr. Crabbe turned his truck’s 
lights on and the vehicle drove away.  (Tr., p. 136, Ls. 4-6.) 
 But the suspicious vehicle again returned, and again “nosed in the 
driveway.”  (Tr., p. 136, Ls. 7-10.)  Mr. Crabbe turned his truck’s engine on and 
the vehicle left again.  (Tr., p. 136, Ls. 10-22.)  The vehicle then made a U-turn, 
proceeded towards the Riverview property, and the passenger in the vehicle 
“was holding a flashlight or headlamp or some sort of a light and [was] shining it 
around,” waving it directly towards the Crabbe family.  (Tr., p. 136, L. 22 – p. 
137, p. 18.)  The vehicle once again proceeded to “come over to the driveway 
and come up the driveway.”  (Tr., p. 138, Ls. 1-3.) 
 At that point Mr. Crabbe, now in his truck, drove towards the suspicious 
vehicle.  (Tr., p. 138, Ls. 5-6.)  The vehicle backed out of the driveway for good 
and drove away, giving Mr. Crabbe a view of the passenger, who was “holding 
the headlamp out the window.”  (Tr., p. 138, Ls. 6-11.)  Meanwhile, Mrs. Crabbe 
had called the police and described the vehicle.  (Tr., p. 93, Ls. 9-25; p. 138, Ls. 
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15-18.)  Fewer than five minutes after receiving the call from dispatch, Officer 
Brice LaBelle stopped a vehicle matching the description, and found Clark inside, 
sitting in the passenger seat.  (Tr., p. 94, Ls. 11-15; p. 95, Ls. 7-15.) 
 The vehicle was filled with the stolen property from the Riverview property.  
This included Mr. Crabbe’s headlamp, found on the floorboard on Clark’s side.  
(Tr., p. 102, Ls. 6-8.)  The vehicle’s center console—which was accessible by 
either Clark or the driver—contained Mrs. Crabbe’s financial transaction card, Mr. 
James’s financial transaction cards, and Mr. Crabbe’s driver’s license and 
financial transaction cards.  (Tr., p. 103, L. 25 – p. 106, L. 22.)  The center 
console also contained Mr. Crabbe’s padlock from the shed.  (Tr., p. 111, L. 18 – 
p. 112, L. 12.)  Mr. Crabbe’s license plates were found in the back of the vehicle 
(Tr., p. 112, L. 17 – p. 113, L. 16), and his toolbox and miscellaneous tools were 
found in the back seat, along with Mr. James’s ledger  (Tr., 115, L. 23 – p. 116, 
L. 4; p. 114, Ls. 7-12).  Mr. James’s war medals and military ribbons were found 
in the glove box on Clark’s side.  (Tr., p. 107, Ls. 7-25.)  
 Of note, the stolen screwdriver from Mr. Crabbe’s toolbox was found in 
Clark’s pocket.  The officer testified that: 
Q. The red-handled screwdriver, where on Mr. Clark’s person 
did you find that? 
 
A. On the person and in his pocket. 
 
Q. Do you remember what pocket? 
 
A. Honestly I do not remember which pocket. 
 
Q. Pants pocket or shirt pocket? 
 
A. I don’t remember. 
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Q. But you do remember for sure it being on his person? 
 
A. Yes, sir. And that’s duly noted in my report. 
 
(Tr., p. 102, Ls. 9-19.)  Mr. Crabbe confirmed that the screwdriver was his: 
Q. What about this little red-handled screwdriver right here 
that’s in that same bag? Do you recognize that little red-handled 
screwdriver? 
 
A. The red-handled screwdriver went to the—my little tool set 
that I was given when I was a child. 
 
Q. All right. So here’s Exhibit 20. Do you recognize the toolbox? 
 
A. This is the toolbox, yes. 
 
Q. This is what toolbox? 
 
A. This is the toolbox that I was given when I was five years 
old. 
 
Q. And this red-handled screwdriver— 
 
A. It was part of the set. 
 
Q. It was in the box? 
 
A. It was in the box. 
 
Q. And where was the box? 
 
A. The box was in the shed. 
 




(Tr., p. 140, L. 20 – L. 141, L. 13.) 
 In addition to the stolen property found in the car and on Clark’s person, 
law enforcement found black gloves, shaved keys, and a flashlight on the 
passenger side floorboard.  (Tr., p. 102, Ls. 1-25; p. 103, Ls. 16-18.)  When 
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asked about the circumstances, Clark said that “he was out for a drive on 
Riverview,” and claimed it was all a misunderstanding. (Tr., p. 118, Ls. 11-13.)  
When asked about the stolen property, Clark initially told law enforcement “that 
he didn’t know anything about it.”  (Tr., p. 119, Ls. 2-6.)  But he then stated “that 
the items found might have been found in a garbage sack along Riverview they’d 
discovered earlier in the day.”  (Tr., p. 119, Ls. 6-8.) 
 Clark was charged by amended information with burglary and grand theft 
of a financial transaction card.1  (R., pp. 97-99.)   
During trial, following the close of the state’s case, Clark moved for an 
acquittal due to insufficient evidence, which the district court denied.  (Tr., p. 171, 
L. 10 – p. 176, L. 15.) 
The jury found Clark guilty of burglary and grand theft.  (Tr., p. 210, L. 23 
– p. 211, L. 4; R., pp. 143-44.)  Clark timely appeals from the judgment of 
conviction.  (R., pp. 154-59, 161-63, 171-175.)  
                                            
1 The trial transcript reflects the driver of the vehicle pleaded guilty to grand theft, 
burglary, and possession of methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 14, L. 22 – p. 15, L. 1.) 
The jury was told that neither Clark nor the driver was the owner of the vehicle.  
(Tr.,  p. 120, L. 13 – p. 121, L. 4.)  The jury also heard that the driver “pled guilty 





Clark states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the State offer evidence sufficient to sustain Mr. Clark’s 
convictions for burglary or grand theft? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 






Clark Has Failed To Show There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support His 
Convictions For Burglary And Grand Theft 
 
A. Introduction 
 On appeal, Clark argues there was insufficient evidence to support his 
convictions for burglary and grand theft.  He argues that the evidence against 
him was purely circumstantial (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-14), and claims that 
evidence showing he was in actual physical possession of some of the stolen 
property would only support an improper multiple-inference analysis.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-17.) 
 These arguments fail.  Circumstantial evidence can support a jury’s 
verdict and it is well settled that a defendant’s participation in a theft may be 
inferred from the defendant’s unexplained possession of recently stolen property.  
As such, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.”  State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011).  Idaho’s 
appellate courts will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992).  In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
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credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 
955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. 
App. 1991).  Furthermore, the facts and inferences to be drawn from those facts 
are construed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”  Miller, 131 Idaho 
at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
Moreover, “substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence 
presented is solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence.”  State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009).  “[E]ven when 
circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a finding of 
innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to 
reasonable inferences of guilt.”  Id. 
 
C. Substantial Evidence Supported Clark’s Convictions Here, Including 
Evidence Showing Clark Was In Actual Physical Possession Of Some Of 
The Stolen Property 
 
 There was substantial evidence here to support the jury’s verdict.  Clark 
was found canvassing the scene of the crime, in a vehicle filled with the stolen 
property at issue.  (Tr., p. 95, Ls. 7-15; p. 102, L. 6 – p. 107, L. 25; p. 135, L. 20 
– p. 138, L. 11.)  He was surrounded by the stolen property, including a stolen 
headlamp found near his feet, which at one point he appeared to be using.  (Tr., 
p. 102, L. 6 – p. 107, L. 25; p. 137, L. 4 – p. 138, L. 11.)  Moreover, the 
undisputed testimony from the officer and the victim was that a stolen 
screwdriver was found in Clark’s pocket.  (Tr., p. 102, Ls. 9-19; p. 140, L. 20 – L. 
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141, L. 13.)  Clark’s contradictory explanations did nothing to dispel the 
suspicious circumstances—he first said he “didn’t know anything about” the 
property, but then said that “the items found might have been found in a garbage 
sack along Riverview they’d discovered earlier in the day.”  (Tr., p. 119, Ls. 2-8.)  
Any rational factfinder could conclude, as the jury did, that based on Clark’s 
proximity to the crime scene, position amidst the evidence, actual possession of 
stolen property, and unconvincing explanation of the same, that he participated 
in the theft itself.  Construing the facts and inferences “in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution,” and giving weight to the inferences drawn by the jury, there 
was plainly substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that Clark was guilty 
of burglary and grand theft. 
 Clark argues otherwise on appeal and claims the evidence here was 
“purely circumstantial.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)  This argument fails because 
even assuming the evidence was solely circumstantial, such evidence can 
support a jury verdict.  Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432.  And the  
circumstantial evidence here—such as Clark’s proximity to the crime scene, his 
close proximity to a large amount of the stolen property, and his contradictory 
explanations to law enforcement—reasonably supported an inference that Clark 
burglarized the structures and took the property.  When taken together with the 
direct evidence—Clark’s actual possession of some of the property—Clark has 
failed to show that “any inference of guilt gleaned from the circumstantial 
evidence” was at all unreasonable, much less “wholly unreasonable.”  (See 
Appellant’s brief, p. 13 (emphasis in original).) 
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Clark challenges the significance of evidence showing he actually 
possessed some of the stolen property.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-17.)  He 
does so by reframing that uncontested evidence as an inference.  Clark states 
that “a reasonable jury could have inferred that Mr. Clark was in possession of 
stolen property,” and characterizes the issue this way: 
The question then is whether a reasonable jury, after inferring Mr. 
Clark was in possession of the property stolen from the Riverview 
property, could use that inference to further infer that he was also 
the one who broke into the house, barn, and shed on the Riverview 
property and stole the items in the first instance. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15 (emphasis added).)  Clark goes on to challenge “a 
second inference heaped upon the first inference that Mr. Clark was even in 
possession of the stolen property,” which he contends would be improper.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16 (emphasis added).)   
But Clark attacks a strawman here, because the evidence showing he 
possessed property stolen in the burglary of the Riverview property was not an 
inference.  The uncontested testimony presented at trial was that Clark was in 
actual physical possession of such stolen property.  (Tr., p. 102, Ls. 9-19; p. 140, 
L. 20 – L. 141, L. 13.)  Clark himself concedes on appeal that he physically 
possessed the screwdriver.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)  Based on all the 
evidence, Clark’s possession of stolen property was not an inference in any 
meaningful sense of the word, but a testified-to fact.  Accordingly, regardless of 
the propriety of heaping “a second inference … upon the first inference,” Clark’s 
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heaping-inference analysis begins from a flawed premise, asks the wrong 
question, and arrives at an irrelevant answer.2 
The question in this case, accurately framed, is whether uncontested 
evidence that Clark possessed stolen property could have reasonably supported 
an inference that he also participated in the theft.  The answer: of course it could 
have. The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held “[t]he defendant’s 
participation in a theft may be inferred from the defendant’s unexplained 
possession of recently stolen property.”  State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 635, 
619 P.2d 787, 790 (1979).  The Owens Court relied on State v. Ponthier, which 
Clark acknowledges in his briefing, which found it “well settled in this state that 
the unexplained possession of recently stolen property raises an inference of 
guilt and may be enough by itself to justify a conviction of burglary.”  92 Idaho 
704, 705, 449 P.2d 364, 365 (1969) (noting that “[t]his rule is also supported by a 
majority of the other jurisdictions”).  The 9th Circuit has persuasively applied this 
rule time and time again.  See United States v. Trice, 476 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir. 
                                            
2 Furthermore, Clark fails to show from the outset that two-step inferences would 
be unreasonable evidence to support the jury verdict.  Clark cites to Abdullah, 
which was examining the improper amount of inferences required to conclude 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 
15-16); State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 467, 348 P.3d 1, 82 (2015) (“To reach 
Abdullah’s contention that the prosecutor attempted to capture the general 
public’s alleged animosity towards certain ethnicities and religious groups for the 
September 11 terrorist attacks would require inference upon inference, all in 
spite of the instruction to the jury that prejudice should not influence their 
deliberation.”)  Because Clark fails to support his argument that a second 
inference based on a first inference would be unreasonable for a jury weighing 
the evidence, this argument should not be considered on appeal.  State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)  (“When issues on appeal 
are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered.”). 
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1973) (“The possession of recently stolen property will support an inference that 
Trice was the thief.”); United States v. Martin, 459 F.2d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 
1972) (“There can be no doubt that the fact of possession of recently stolen 
property permits inferences that the possessor was the thief, that he knew the 
property was stolen and that he participated in its transportation from the place 
where it was stolen.”); Corey v. United States, 305 F.2d 232, 238 (9th Cir. 1962) 
(“However, we would think that [the defendant’s] physical possession of one 
portion of the jewelry stolen in a single theft, even if it stood alone, would justify 
an inference of knowledge on his part that the whole was stolen.”). 
 Furthermore, in Barnes v. United States, the United States Supreme 
Court found that where the defendant possessed recently stolen property with no 
plausible explanation, that “[o]n the basis of this evidence alone common sense 
and experience tell us that petitioner must have known or been aware of the high 
probability that the checks were stolen.”  412 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1973) (noting 
that this common-law inference was “deeply rooted in our law” with antecedents 
dating back to the 7th century, and that “[f]or centuries courts have instructed 
juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of 
unexplained possession of stolen goods”).  The controlling and persuasive case 
law on this point affirms what common sense already dictates: one can 
reasonably infer from a defendant’s possession of stolen property that he also 
participated in the theft. 
Lastly, Clark claims the evidence against him would not square with the 
evidence before the jury that the driver of the vehicle pleaded guilty to burglary.  
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(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  Per Clark, “assuming [the jury] found Mr. 
Clark acted alone,” the jury must have ignored the fact that the driver pleaded 
guilty.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)  This line of attack fails because it begs the 
question; Clark has given no reason to think, nor is there any indication in the 
record, that the jury “found Mr. Clark acted alone.”  (See generally, Appellant’s 
brief; see also Tr.) 
Clark theorizes in the alternative that the jury must have “simply assumed 
that because Mr. Clark was with [the driver of the vehicle] on the night of 
November 3-4, 2015 he must also have been her accomplice whenever she 
committed the burglary/thefts”—which Clark rejects “because it would have 
required the jury to speculate wildly.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  But this 
understated reconstruction of events omits the facts that make the case: Clark 
was not simply “with” the driver on November 3-4; he was with her, in a vehicle 
canvassing the scene of the crime, surrounded by the stolen property, appearing 
at one point to be using the stolen property, all while he was in uncontested 
actual physical possession of some of the stolen property.  Given these facts, 
and Clark’s contradictory explanation for them, one need not speculate wildly to 
conclude—as the jury quite reasonably did—that Clark participated in the theft 
and burglary. 
Because of all the evidence linking Clark to the crimes, including the 
uncontested evidence that he possessed some of the stolen property, it was 
eminently reasonable to find for the jury to find that Clark participated in the 
burglary and theft.  Given the factual record and the applicable standards Clark 
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 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Clark’s judgment of 
conviction. 
 DATED this 13th day of June, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans___________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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